Various languages have been proposed as speci cation languages for representing a wide variety of logics. The development of typed -calculi has been one approach toward this goal. The logical framework (LF), a -calculus with dependent types is one example of such a language. A small subset of intuitionistic logic with quanti cation over the simply typed -calculus has also been proposed as a framework for specifying general logics. The logic of hereditary Harrop formulas with quanti cation at all non-predicate types, denoted here as hh ! , is such a meta-logic. In this paper, we show how to translate speci cations in LF into hh ! speci cations in a direct and natural way, so that correct typing in LF corresponds to intuitionistic provability in hh ! . In addition, we demonstrate a direct correspondence between proofs in these two systems. The logic of hh ! can be implemented using such logic programming techniques as providing operational interpretations to the connectives and implementing uni cation on -terms. As a result, relating these two languages makes it possible to provide direct implementations of proof checkers and theorem provers for logics speci ed in LF.
Introduction
The design of languages that can express a wide variety of logics has been the focus of much recent work. Such languages attempt to provide a general theory of inference systems that captures uniformities across di erent logics, so that they can be exploited in implementing theorem provers and proof systems. One approach to the design of such languages is the development of various typed -calculi. Examples that have been proposed include the AUTOMATH languages 4], type theories developed by Martin-L of 16], the Logical Framework (LF) 10], and the Calculus of Constructions 3] . A second approach is the use of a simple intuitionistic logic as a meta-language for expressing a wide variety of logics. The Isabelle theorem prover 20] and the Prolog logic programming language 18] provide implementations of a common subset of intuitionistic logic, called hh ! here, that can be used for this purpose.
In this paper, we will illustrate a strong correspondence between one language in the rst category and a language in the second. In particular, we shall show how the Logical Framework (LF), a typed -calculus with dependent types, has essentially the same expressive power as hh ! . We do so by showing how to translate LF typing judgments into hh ! formulas such that correct typing in LF corresponds to intuitionistic provability in hh ! .
Both Isabelle and Prolog can turn speci cations of logics into proof checkers and theorem provers by making use of the uni cation of simply typed -terms and goaldirected, tactic-style search. Thus, besides answering the theoretical question about the precise relationship between these two meta-languages, this translation also describes how LF speci cations of object logics can be implemented within such systems.
The translation we present here extends a translation given in 9]. As in that paper, we consider a form of LF such that all terms in derivable assertions are in canonical form, a notion which corresponds to -long normal form in the simply typed -calculus. In the translation given there, the form of proofs was also greatly limited. As we will illustrate, although we also restrict the form of terms here, we retain essentially the same power of provability as in LF as presented in 10] . As a result, theorem provers implemented from the hh ! speci cations obtained from this translation have a greater degree of exibility.
In the next section, we provide some further motivation for establishing a formal relation between these two meta-languages. Then, in Section 3 we present LF, and in Section 4 we present the meta-logic hh ! . Section 5 presents a translation of LF into hh ! and Section 6 contains a proof of its correctness. Section 7 provides examples of this translation using an LF speci cation of natural deduction for rst-order logic. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
Motivation
Our objectives in de ning an encoding from LF into hh ! are both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, we hope that by providing an alternate presentation of LF (via its encoding into a di erent formalism), we can provide some insight into the information contained in dependent types. In addition, we wish to formally establish the correspondence between two di erent approaches to specifying general logics. On the practical side, as already mentioned, we wish to provide an approach to implementing proof checkers and theorem provers for logics speci ed in these meta-languages. We address both of these concerns below.
Dependent Types as Formulas
A dependent type in LF has the structure x : A:B where A and B are types and x is a variable of type A bound in this expression. The type B may contain occurrences of x. This structure represents a \functional type." If f is a function of this type, and N is a term of type A, then fN (f applied to N) has the type B where all occurrences of x are replaced by N, often written N=x]B. Thus the argument type is A and the result type depends on the value input to the function. Another way to read such a type is as follows: \for any element x, if x has type A then fx has type B." This reading suggests a logical interpretation of such a type: \for any" suggests universal quanti cation while \if then" suggests implication. It is exactly this kind of \propositional content" of dependent types that will be made explicit by our encoding. When x does not occur in B, such a dependent type corresponds to the simple functional type A ! B. Note that the logical reading remains the same in this simpler case. For the case when x occurs in B, we can think of B as a predicate over x.
In the LF encoding of natural deduction for rst-order logic, for example, rst-order formulas are represented as LF terms of type form and a function true of type form ! Type is de ned which takes formulas into LF types. The constant true is used to encode the provability judgment of rst-order logic: the type (true A) represents the statement \formula A is provable," and LF terms of this type are identi ed with natural deduction proofs for this formula. (This is an example of the LF \judgments as types" principle, similar to the \formulas as types" principle as in 14] .) Via the encoding in hh ! , we will view true as a predicate over rst-order formulas. Proofs of the predicate (true A) in hh ! can be identi ed with natural deduction proofs of A. Our results establish a very close connection between hh ! proofs of such predicates and LF proofs of their corresponding typing judgments.
Implementing Goal Directed Search in Dependent-Type Calculi
In general, the search for terms inhabiting types in LF corresponds to object-level theorem proving. For example, searching for a term of type (true C^D) corresponds to searching for a natural deduction proof of the conjunction C^D. To nd a term of this type we may use, for example, the following item which encodes the^-introduction rule for natural deduction. Consider the following general goal directed approach to the search for an inhabiting term of a given type. If the type is atomic, attempt to match it with the target type of an existing axiom or hypothesis. If there is a match, attempt to nd inhabitants of each of the argument types. If the type is of the form x:A:B, add x:A as a new hypothesis, and attempt to nd an inhabitant of B. It is exactly this kind of approach to search that we obtain via the translation. More speci cally, our encoding will map each LF axiom such as the one above specifying the^-introduction rule to an hh ! formula. With respect to a logic programming interpreter implementing hh ! that will be described in Section 4, search using such translated LF axioms will correspond exactly to the above description of goal directed search in LF.
We will see that a set of hh ! formulas obtained by translating an LF representation of an object logic can serve directly as a proof checker for that logic. In other words, a given hh ! formula will be provable with respect to the depth-rst interpreter implementing hh ! described in Section 4 if and only if the corresponding LF typing judgment is provable in the LF type system. For theorem proving, or searching for a term inhabiting a type, more sophisticated control is necessary. In 7] , it is shown that a theorem proving environment with tactic style search can be implemented in Prolog. The clauses obtained by the translation can serve as the basic operations to such a theorem prover. In fact, tactic theorem provers for many of the example LF speci cations given in 1] have been implemented and tested in Prolog. Within such a tactic environment, more complex search strategies can be written from the basic operations. For example, for a theorem prover obtained by translating an LF speci cation of natural deduction, a simple tactic can be written that automates the application of introduction rules, performing all possible applications of such rules to a given input formula.
The hh ! speci cation of natural deduction described in Section 7 obtained via translation is in fact quite similar to the direct speci cation given in 7] . Thus, the tactic theorem prover described in that paper is very similar in behavior to the one obtained via translation. One di erence is that an alternate speci cation of the elimination rules is given in 7] such that goal-directed search in hh ! corresponds to forward reasoning in natural deduction. Using this approach, it is possible to apply rules to existing hypotheses in a forward direction, a capability which is quite useful for theorem proving in natural deduction style systems. (See also 6] for more on this kind of reasoning in natural deduction and its correspondence to backward reasoning on the left in sequent style inference systems.) It is in fact straightforward to de ne an LF speci cation of natural deduction in rst-order logic whose translation has the property that rules can be applied to hypotheses in a forward direction. Thus a goal directed strategy at the meta-level (LF or hh ! ) does not necessarily impose a goal directed strategy at the object-level.
The Logical Framework
There are three levels of terms in the LF type theory: objects (often called just terms), types and families of types, and kinds. We assume two given denumerable sets of variables, one for object-level variables and the other for type family-level variables. The syntax of LF is given by the following classes of objects.
K := Type j x:A:K A := x j x:A:B j x:A:B j AM M := x j x:A:M j MN ? := hi j ?; x:K j ?; x:A j ?; A:K j ?; M :A Here M and N range over expressions for objects, A and B over types and families of types, K over kinds, x over variables, and ? over contexts. The empty context is denoted by hi. We will use P and Q to range over arbitrary objects, types, type families, or kinds. We write A ! P for x:A:P when x does not occur in type or kind P. We will say that a type or type family of the form xN 1 : : :N n where n 0 and x is a type family-level variable is a at type.
Terms that di er only in the names of variables bound by or are identi ed. If x is an object-level variable and N is an object then N=x] denotes the operation of substituting N for all free occurrences of x, systematically changing bound variables in order to avoid variable capture. The expression N 1 =x 1 ; : : :; N n =x n ] will denote the simultaneous substitution of the terms N 1 ; : : :; N n for distinct variables x 1 ; : : :; x n , respectively.
The notion of -conversion at the level of objects, types, type families, and kinds can be de ned in the obvious way using the usual rule for -reduction at the level of both objects and type families: ( x : A:P)N ! N=x]P where P is either an object or type/type family. The relation of convertibility up to is written as = . All well-typed LF terms are strongly normalizing 10]. We write P to denote the normal form of term P.
Let Q be a type or kind whose normal form is x 1 :A 1 : : : x n :A n :P where P is Type, a variable, or an application. We de ne the order of Q to be 0 if n is 0, and 1 greater than the maximum order of A 1 ; : : :; A n otherwise.
We present a version of the LF proof system that constructs only terms in canonical form. Several de nitions from 11] are required to establish this notion. We de ne the arity of a type or kind to be the number of s in the pre x of its normal form. The arity of a variable with respect to a context is the arity of its type in that context. The arity of a bound variable occurrence in a term is the arity of the type label attached to its binding occurrence. An occurrence of a variable x in a term is fully applied with respect to a context if it occurs in a subterm of the form xM 1 : : :M n , where n is the arity of x. A term P is canonical with respect to a context ? if P is in -normal form and every variable occurrence in P is fully applied with respect to ?. A term P is pre-canonical if its -normal form is canonical. Flat types xN 1 : : :N n such that x is fully applied will be called base types.
The following four kinds of assertions are derivable in the LF type theory.
? Figure 1 : LF contexts and abstraction rules the variables x 1 ; : : :; x n do not occur free in N 1 ; : : :; N n . Note that bound variables can always be renamed to meet these restrictions. In addition, in (APP-OBJ) B must be a base type. Note that when B is a base type, so is ( N 1 =x 1 ; : : :; N n =x n ]B) .
Items introduced into contexts by (FAM-LEMMA) or (OBJ-LEMMA) will be called context lemmas. The main di erences between this presentation and the usual presentation of the LF type system are the appearance of such lemmas in contexts and the form of the (APP-FAM) and (APP-OBJ) rules. Here, in any derivation, all terms that are used on the left of an application must occur explicitly in the context.
We say that a context ? is canonical (pre-canonical) if for every item x:P in ? where x is a variable, P is canonical (pre-canonical), and for every context lemma P : Q in ?, both P and Q are canonical (pre-canonical) with respect to ?. We say that an assertion is canonical (pre-canonical) if the context is canonical (pre-canonical) and all terms in the judgment on the left of the turnstile are canonical (pre-canonical). In this presentation, all derivable assertions are canonical. To see why, rst note that no new -redexes are introduced in the conclusion of any rule. Second, consider the application rules. In the (APP-OBJ) or (APP-FAM) rule, if the term on the left of the application is a variable x, then it has arity n and is applied in the conclusion to n terms and thus this occurrence of x is fully applied. Hence, as long as N 1 ; : : :; N n are canonical, so is xN 1 : : :N n . If the term on the left of the application is a canonical term, then it has the form x 1 :A 1 : : : x n :A n :P. The term in the conclusion has the form (( x 1 : A 1 : : : x n : A n :P)N 1 : : :N n ) which is equivalent to ( N 1 =x 1 ; : : :; N n =x n ]P) . The fact that this latter term is canonical follows from the fact that for any object, type, type family, or kind Q and any object N, if Q and N are canonical, then so is ( N=x]Q) . For the same reason, the type ( N 1 =x 1 ; : : :; N n =x n ]B) in the (APP-OBJ) rule is canonical.
In Appendix A, we show formally the correspondence between LF as presented in 10], which we call full LF, and LF as presented here, which we will call canonical LF. In full LF, terms in derivable judgments are not necessarily canonical or -normal. For a provable assertion ?` in full LF, we say that ? ` is its normal form. In
Appendix A, we demonstrate that any derivation of a pre-canonical assertion in full LF can be mapped directly to a derivation in canonical LF of its normal form. Conversely, any derivation of ?` in canonical LF has a corresponding derivation of a pre-canonical assertion in full LF whose normal form is ?` . It is important to emphasize that these results demonstrate not only a correspondence between what is provable in each system, but also a direct correspondence between derivations in each system. In other words, full LF restricted to pre-canonical terms is essentially the same system as canonical LF presented here.
It can now be seen how the goal directed strategy discussed in Section 2 can be applied to construct a proof of an LF assertion in this system. For example to nd an object inhabiting an LF type, the (ABS-OBJ) rule is applied if the type has a leading , and the (APP-OBJ) rule is attempted if the type is atomic. In this case, goal directed proof corresponds to searching for a term in the context whose target type matches with the atomic type. 4 The Intuitionistic Logic hh ! The terms of the logic hh ! are the simply typed -terms. Let S be a xed, nite set of primitive types. We assume that the symbol o is always a member of S. Following Church 2] , o is the type for propositions. The set of types is the smallest set of expressions that contains the primitive types and is closed under the construction of function types, denoted by the binary, in x symbol !. The Greek letter is used as a syntactic variable ranging over types. The type constructor ! associates to the right. If 0 is a primitive type then the type 1 ! ! n ! 0 has 1 ; : : :; n as argument types and 0 as target type. The order of a primitive type is 0 while the order or a non-primitive type is one greater than the maximum order of its argument types.
For each type , we assume that there are denumerably many constants and variables of that type. Constants and variables do not overlap and if two constants (variables) have di erent types, they are di erent constants (variables). A signature is a nite set of constants and variables whose types are such that their argument types do not contain o. A constant with target type o is a predicate constant.
Simply typed -terms are built in the usual way. An abstraction is written as x t, or x : :t when we wish to be explicit about the type of the bound variable x. The logical constants are given the following types:^(conjunction) and ( If x and t are terms of the same type then t=x] denotes the operation of substituting t for all free occurrences of x, systematically changing bound variables in order to avoid variable capture. The expression t 1 =x 1 ; : : :; t n =x n ] will denote the simultaneous substitution of the terms t 1 ; : : :; t n for distinct variables x 1 ; : : :; x n , respectively.
We shall assume that the reader is familiar with the usual notions and properties of , , and conversion for the simply typed -calculus. The relation of convertibility up to and is written as = (as it is for LF), and if is added, is written as = . A -term is in -normal form if it contains no beta redexes, that is, subformulas of the form ( x t)s. We say that an occurrence of a variable or constant h in a simply typed -term is fully applied if it occurs in a subterm of the form ht 1 : : :t n having primitive type. The term h is called the head of this subterm. A -term is in -long form if it is in -normal form and every variable and constant occurrence is fully applied. All -terms -convert to a term in -long form, unique up to -conversion. See 13] for a fuller discussion of these basic properties of the simply typed -calculus.
Let be a signature. A term is a -term if all of its free variables and nonlogical constants are members of . Similarly, a formula is a -formula if all of its free variables and nonlogical constants are members of . A formula is either atomic or non-atomic.
An atomic -formula is of the form (Pt 1 : : :t n ), where n 0, P is given type 1 ! ! n ! o by , and t 1 ; : : :; t n are terms of the types 1 ; : : :; n , respectively. The predicate constant P is the head of this atomic formula. Non-atomic formulas are of the form >, . First-order hereditary Harrop formulas (fohh) have been studied as an extension to rst-order Horn clauses as a basis for logic programming. Similarly higher-order hereditary Harrop formulas (hohh) are a generalization of fohh that permits some forms of predicate quanti cation. Because our meta-language is neither higher-order, since it lacks predicate quanti cation, nor rstorder, since it contains quanti cation at all function types, we shall simply call it hh ! . The set of hh ! formulas in which quanti cation only up to order n is used will be labeled as hh n . Provability for hh ! can be given in terms of sequent calculus proofs. A sequent is a triple ; P ?! B, where is a signature, B is a -formula, and P is a nite (possibly empty) sets of -formulas. The set P is this sequent's antecedent and B is its succedent. Later, when discussing an interpreter for this language, we also say that P is a program, that each formula in P is a clause, and that B is a goal formula. The expression B; P denotes the set P fBg; this notation is used even if B 2 P. The inference rules for sequents are presented in Figure 3 . The following provisos are also attached to the two inference rules for quanti er introduction: in 8-R c is a constant of type not in , and in 8-L t is a -term of type .
A proof of the sequent ; P ?! B is a nite tree constructed using these inference rules such that the root is labeled with ; P ?! B and the leaves are labeled with initial sequents, that is, sequents 0 ; P 0 ?! B 0 such that either B 0 is > or B 0 2 P 0 .
The non-terminals in such a tree are instances of the inference gures in Figure 3 . Since we do not have an inference gure for -conversion, we shall assume that in building a proof, two formulas are equal if they are -convertible. If the sequent ; P ?! B has a sequent proof then we write ; P`I B and say that B is provable from and P. The following two theorems establish the main proof theoretic results of hh ! we shall need. These theorems are direct consequences of the proof theory of a more expressive logic studied in 17].
Theorem 1 Let be a signature, let P be a nite set of -formulas, and let B be a -formula. The sequent ; P ?! B has a proof if and only if it has a proof in which every sequent containing a non-atomic formula as its succedent is the conclusion of a right introduction rule.
To state our second theorem, we need the following de nition.
De nition 2 Let be a signature and let P be a nite set of -formulas. Theorem 3 Let be a signature, let P be a nite set of -formulas, and let A be an atomic -formula. Then A is provable from and P if and only if there is a pair hG; Ai 2 jPj so that for each G 2 G, G is provable from and P.
Given these two theorems, it is clear how a non-deterministic search procedure for hh ! can be organized using the following four search primitives. 
BACKCHAIN:
The atomic formula A is provable from and P if and only if there is a pair hG; Ai 2 jPj so that for every G 2 G, G is provable from and P.
To implement an interpreter which implements these search operations, choices must be made which are left unspeci ed in the high-level description above. Here, we assume choices as in the Prolog language. For example, logic variables are employed in the BACKCHAIN operation to create universal instances of de nite clauses. As a result, unication on -terms is necessary since logic variables of arbitrary functional type can occur inside -terms. Also the equality of terms is not a simple syntactic check but a more complex check of -conversion. Uni cation on -terms is not in general decidable. In Prolog, this issue is addressed by implementing a depth-rst version of the uni cation search procedure described in 15] . ( See 19, 17] .) In this paper, the uni cation problems that result from programs we present are all decidable and rather simple.
In the AUGMENT search operation, clauses get added to the program dynamically. Note that as a result, clauses may in fact contain logic variables. The GENERIC operation must be implemented so that the new constant c introduced for x, must not appear in the terms eventually instantiated for logic variables free in the goal or in the program when c is introduced. A deterministic interpreter must also specify the order in which conjuncts are attempted and de nite clauses are backchained over. One possibility is to attempt conjuncts and backchain on de nite clauses in the order in which they appear in the goal or in P, respectively, using a depth-rst search paradigm to handle failures as in Prolog.
Translating LF Assertions to hh ! Formulas
In this section we present the translation of LF assertions to formulas in hh ! . This translation will require an encoding of LF terms as simply typed -terms. We begin by presenting this encoding. We then present the translation, which has three parts. The rst translates context items to a set of hh ! formulas to be used as assumptions, while the second translates LF judgments to a formula to be proven with respect to such a set of assumptions. The third translation is de ned using the previous two, and translates an LF assertion ?` to a single formula whose proof veri es that ? is a valid context before proving that holds within the context ?.
In this section, since we encode LF in hh ! , we consider hh ! as the meta-language and LF as the object-language. Since both languages have types and terms, to avoid confusion we will refer to types and terms of hh ! as meta-types and meta-terms. In order to de ne an encoding of LF terms as simply typed -terms, we change slightly the notion of LF syntax. We will associate to each object and type variable, a tag which indicates the \syntactic structure" of types and kinds, respectively, which can be associated with it in forming a binder or a context item. These tags will be \simple types" built up from two primitive types ob and ty and the arrow constructor !, with the additional restriction that ty can only appear as a target type. We assume that there is an in nite number of object-level and type-level variables associated with every simple type whose target type is ob and ty, respectively. Let x be an object or type variable and 1 ! ! n ! 0 be the tag associated with x, where n 0 and 0 is ob or ty. We say that variable x admits type or kind x 1 : A 1 : : :x n : A n :P if the following hold: if 0 is ty then P is Type; if 0 is ob, then P is a at type; for i = 1; : : :; n, the tag associated with x i is i and x i admits type A i . We add a restriction when forming the or binder x : A, or the context item x : A or x : K, that x admits type A or kind K. Note that this restriction requires that the \simple type" in a variable tag has exactly the same order as the LF type or kind used in forming the binder.
We only de ne the encoding of LF terms as simply typed -terms for LF objects and at types since this is all that is required by the translation. We introduce two primitive types at the meta-level, ob and ty, for these two classes of LF terms. The types ob and ty in variable tags correspond to these meta-types in the obvious way. When we wish to be explicit, we write T (x) to denote the meta-type associated with the tag on LF variable x obtained by replacing each occurrence of ob by ob and ty by ty. We will assume a xed mapping which associates each LF variable x to a meta-variable of type T (x). For readability in our presentation, this mapping will be implicit. A variable x will represent both an LF variable and its corresponding meta-variable. It will always be clear from context which is meant.
We denote the encoding of term or type P as hhPii. The full encoding is de ned in at the meta-level, and that both application of objects to objects and application of type families to objects are mapped directly to application at the meta-level. The di erence at the meta-level is that the former application will be a meta-term with target type ob while the latter application will be a meta-term with target type ty. We can easily de ne a function which maps an LF type or kind to the simple type corresponding to the tag on a variable that admits this type or kind: ( x : A:P) is (A) ! (P), (Type) is ty, and (xN 1 : : :N n ) is ob. It is easy to see that for object or type family P having, respectively, type or kind Q, hhPii is a meta-term of meta-type (Q).
Two predicates will appear in the atomic hh ! formulas resulting from the translation: hastype of type ob ! ty ! o and istype of type ty ! o. We will name the signature containing these two predicates LF . We denote the translation of the context item P :Q as P : Q]] + . This translation is de ned in Figure 5 (a). It is a partial function since it is de ned by cases and unde ned when no case applies. It will in fact always be de ned on valid context items. When applied to a valid context item, P in the rst two clauses in Figure 5 (a) will always be either an object or type family, and Q a type or kind, respectively. As was noted earlier, valid contexts are always in canonical form. Note that in a canonical context item x:P, the variable x is not necessarily canonical since it may not be fully applied. Such judgments with non-canonical terms on the left are handled by the second clause of the de nition. Note the direct mapping of -abstraction in LF types and kinds to instances of universal quanti cation and implication in hh ! formulas, as discussed earlier. In the rst two clauses of the de nition, the variable bound by is mapped to a variable at the meta-level bound by universal quanti cation. Then, in the resulting implication, the left hand side asserts the fact that the bound variable has a certain type, while the right hand side contains the translation of the body of the type or kind which may contain occurrences of this bound variable. The base cases occur when there is no leading in the type or kind, resulting in atomic formulas for the hastype and istype predicates.
To illustrate this translation, we consider an example from an LF context specifying natural deduction for rst-order logic. Figure 6 contains the general translation for LF assertions. Given assertion ?` , the pair (?; ) is mapped to a single formula containing subformulas whose proofs will insure that each context item is valid and that the judgment holds in this context. The translation of such a pair is denoted ?; ]]. The rst two clauses of this translation map each context item to a conjunctive formula where the rst conjunct veri es that the type or kind is valid (using the translation on LF judgments), and the second conjunct is a universally quanti ed implication where the left hand side asserts the fact that the context item has the corresponding type (using the translation on contexts), and the right side contains the translation of the pair consisting of the remaining context items and judgment. The third clause handles context lemmas. Again there are two conjuncts. The rst translates the lemma as a judgment to verify that it holds, while the second translates it as a context item which will be available as an assumption in proving that the rest of the context is valid and that the judgment holds within the entire context. The last clause in the translation is for the base case. When the context is empty, the judgment is simply translated using ]] ? . In the next section, we will show formally that for LF assertion ?` , ? is a valid context and ?` is provable in LF if and only if ?; ]] is a provable hh ! formula.
Correctness of Translation
The following two properties hold for the encoding hhii on terms. They will be important for establishing the correctness of the translation. Lemma 4 Let P be an LF object or base type, and N an LF object. Then hhNii=x]hhPii = hh N=x]Pii: Lemma 5 Let P and Q be two LF objects or base types. If P = Q, then hhPii = hhQii. Lemma 4 is proved by induction on the structure of LF terms, while Lemma 5 is proved by induction on a sequence of -reductions to convert P to Q.
In proving the correctness of the translation, we consider a slightly modi ed LF. Our modi ed system replaces the (ABS-FAM) and (ABS-OBJ) rules with the following two rules.
? In proving correctness of the translation, we prove a stronger statement from which correctness will follow directly. This stronger statement will talk about the provability of an arbitrary LF 0 assertion ?` even in the case when ? and the types bound by outermost abstractions in are not valid. We make the following modi cations to the de nition of ]] ? for translating such judgments: we replace the rst clause of where P is not an abstraction. In the rst clause, the removal of the left conjunct in these formulas corresponds to the removal of the left premise in the (ABS) rules. The second clause will be needed for proving our general form of the correctness theorem. Note that with these two clauses, the positive and negative translation are identical on judgments for which they are both de ned.
One further lemma about LF 0 is needed to prove the correctness of the (modi ed) translation. Lemma 4 shows that substitution commutes with the encoding operation. The lemma below extends this result to the translation operation on judgments which translate to provable hh ! formulas. Given a context ?, we write (?) to denote the set of meta-variables obtained by mapping, for each signature item x : P in ?, the variable x to the corresponding meta-variable of type T (x ) and (ABS-FAM 0 ) are also similar, except that the translations do not have the left conjunct and the corresponding LF 0 proofs have only one premise. Next, consider the case when the last rule is (APP-OBJ) with context lemma M : x 1 : A 1 : : : x n : A n :B 2 ? and objects N 1 ; : : :; N n appearing on the right of the colon in the n premises. We must show that the formula below (the translation of the conclusion) is provable from and ?]] + .
(hastype hh(MN 1 : : :N n ) ii hh( N 1 =x 1 ; : : :; N n =x n ]B) ii) (1) (Note that we can assume that x 1 ; : : :; x n do not appear free in M, otherwise we rename them in the above type.) By the induction hypothesis for the n premises and Lemma 6, the following are provable from Thus the formula on the right of the above pair is equivalent to (1) and we have our result. The case when M is a variable, and the case when the last rule in the proof of the LF 0 assertion is (APP-FAM) are similar to this case. The proof of the backward direction is by induction on the structure of the term on the left in , and is similar to the proof of the forward direction. The proof of the case when the term on the left is an abstraction or relies on the fact that there is a sequent proof of the corresponding hh ! formula of the form described by Theorem 1. The proof of the case when the term on the left is an application uses Theorem 3. 
Encoding a Speci cation of First-Order Logic
In this section, we consider some further examples from an LF speci cation of natural deduction in rst-order logic. We begin by illustrating the translation of context items specifying some of the inference rules. We then consider some example LF judgments provable from this context, and discuss both proof checking and theorem proving of the corresponding goals in hh ! .
Note that in general, formulas obtained by translating context items have the form on the left below, but can be rewritten to have the form on the right: 8X 1 (G 1 : : :8X n (G n D) : : :) 8X 1 : : :8X n (G 1^ ^G n D) where n 0, X 1 ; : : :; X n are variables, and G 1 ; : : :; G n ; D are hh ! formulas. (Here we assume that for i = 1; : : :; n, X i+1 ; : : :; X n do not appear free in G i ). For readability, we will write hh ! formulas in the examples in this section simply as G 1^ ^G n D (or just D when n = 0), and assume implicit universal quanti cation over all free variables written as capital letters.
The fragment of an LF speci cation for rst-order logic that we are concerned with is the following.
i i, Ay is a formula, and if t is a term of type i and P is a proof of 8 A, then the term (8 -E A t P) is a proof of the formula At. Note that, as in the translation of the 8 connective given in Section 5, A is a function at the meta-level having syntactic type ob ! ob. It maps rst-order terms to formulas just as it does at the object-level. We next consider the translation of the 8 -I rule as the following formula. 8y((hastype y i) (hastype Ay form))8 y((hastype y i) (hastype Py (true Ay))) (hastype (8 -I A P) (true 8 A))
This clause provides the following description of the information contained in the dependent type: if for arbitrary y of type i, Ay is a formula and Py is a proof of Ay, then the term (8 -I A P) is a proof of 8 A. Here, both A and P are functions at the meta-level having syntactic type ob ! ob. Again, A maps rst-order terms to formulas, while P maps rst-order terms to proofs. As a nal inference rule example, consider the declaration for -I, which translates to the following formula.
(hastype A form)^(hastype B form)8 q((hastype q (true A)) (hastype Pq (true B))) (hastype ( -I A B P) (true A B)) This formula reads: if A and B are formulas and P is a function which maps an arbitrary proof q of A to the proof Pq of B, then the term ( -I A B P) is a proof of A B. Note that P in this formula is a function which maps proofs to proofs.
We consider an example from 21] which is provable in the LF speci cation for natural deduction. The following LF type represents the fact that in rst-order logic, a universal quanti er can be pulled outside a conjunction. )) The encoding of the above judgment using ]] ? is an hh ! formula equivalent to the conjunction of the three formulas below, which are provable from the set of formulas encoding the entire LF context specifying natural deduction in rst-order logic.
(istype i)^8y((hastype y i) ( Once a fact is proved it can be considered a part of the context and used to prove new judgments. In this case, the translation of the above judgment as a context item is the latter of the three formulas above. Thus this formula can be added as an assumption and used in proving new hh ! goals. For example, consider the LF type below. With respect to the interpreter described in Section 4, we will say that an hh ! formula with no logic variables is closed. The formulas we obtain by applying the translation, for example, are all closed. Proving one of the above two formulas, for instance, corresponds to verifying that the closed term represents a natural deduction proof of the rst-order formula in the closed type, i:e:, proving closed formulas corresponds to object-level proof checking. The deterministic interpreter described in Section 4 is in fact su cient to prove such goals. Each BACKCHAIN step will produce new closed subgoals. Consider the rst of the two formulas above. In proving this formula, we obtain a subgoal of the form:
(hastype (T 0 rsp) (true (8 x:ob:(rx^ sx)))): The term at the head of (the normal form of) (T 0 rsp) is 8 -I. At this point in the proof there will be two possible de nite clauses that can be used in backchaining: the translation of the 8 -I context item, and the translation of the lemma T, and either will lead to proof of the subgoal. In fact, for proof checking, we can restrict the set of de nite clauses used to those obtained by translating context items that introduce new variables, discarding those that translate context lemmas, and still retain a complete program with respect to a deterministic control. In this restricted setting, at each step depending on the constant at the head of the term, there will be exactly one clause that can be used in backchaining.
To use such a set of hh ! formulas for object-level theorem proving, we simply use a logic variable in the rst argument to the hastype predicate. For example, to prove the rst-order formula (8 r^ 8 s) (ra^ sa), we begin with the goal:
(hastype M (true (8 r^ 8 s) (ra^ sa)))
where M is a logic variable to be instantiated with a term of the given type. A closed instance of M can easily be mapped back to an LF term having the given type. As discussed in Section 2, depth-rst search is not su cient for such a theorem proving goal since there may often be many de nite clauses to choose from to use in backchaining.
For example, for a subgoal of the form: (hastype M' (true (8 x:ob:(rx^ sx)))) among the options available are backchaining on the clause for the lemma T or backchaining directly on the clause for 8 -I. As discussed earlier, the tactic environment of 7] provides an environment in which such choices can be made. Notice that the translation presented in this paper works via recursion over the structure of types. Thus, -calculi that contain quanti cation over types such as the polymorphic -calculus or the Calculus of Constructions cannot be directly translated in this manner. For example, we cannot de ne the same notion of base type. Translating A : Type when A is a base type, for instance, results in an atomic formula for the istype predicate. In systems with quanti cation over types, whether or not A is a base type may depend on its instances, and cannot be determined at the time of translation. The translation we have described provides a method of directly translating an LF speci cation, so that there is one hh ! formula corresponding to each LF context item. Since each context item represents a concept of the logic being speci ed, in the resulting proof checkers and theorem provers, each (BACKCHAIN) step is on a clause for a particular constant representing an object-level notion. Another approach to implementing LF speci cations is to implement the inference rules of LF directly as hh ! formulas, coding the provability relation directly into the meta-language. An LF context specifying a particular logic would serve as a parameter to such a speci cation. Such an approach adds one level of indirection in implementing object logics since now each (BACKCHAIN) step corresponds to the application of an LF rule. This approach to implementing typed -calculi is taken in 8], where it is also shown that it can be applied to systems with quanti cation over types.
Such an approach requires an encoding of terms at all levels of the calculus being speci ed. In LF, for instance, meta-level constants for the various notions of application and abstraction must be introduced. For example, at the level of types a constant of type ty ! ob ! ty can be introduced to represent application, while constants of type (ob ! ty) ! ty can be introduced for and -abstraction. A coding of the convertibility relation on terms is also required in this setting. Note that the above simple types have order 1 and 2 respectively. In fact hh 2 is all that is required to encode provability of typed -calculi in this manner. In 5], using such an encoding on terms, it was shown that a direct encoding of LF speci cations using the approach in this paper can be de ned in just hh 2 . The proofs of the correctness of that encoding are similar to those presented here.
In 12], a similar approach based on recursion over types is adopted to implement a subset of the Calculus of Constructions. In the meta-language used there, terms are the terms of the Calculus of Constructions, and a simple language of clauses over these terms is de ned. During goal-directed proof, when a new assumption is introduced, the clause corresponding to this assumption is added dynamically and is then available for backchaining. In this way, certain forms of quanti cation over types can be handled. Such an approach can be implemented in Prolog by implementing the translation as a Prolog program and performing the translation dynamically as types become instantiated to obtain new assumptions which can be used in subsequent proof checking and theorem proving subgoals.
In the Elf programming language 21], a logic programming language is described that gives operational interpretations directly to LF types similar to the way in which the interpreter described in Section 4 gives operational interpretations to the connectives of hh ! . Logic variables are also used in this implementation, and the more complex operation of uni cation on LF terms is required. The LF speci cation for rst-order logic discussed in Section 7, for example, can serve directly as a program in this language. The operational behavior, of such a program, although similar to the execution of an hh ! speci cation, has several di erences. For instance, certain operations which are handled directly at the meta-level by uni cation on types in an Elf implementation are expressed explicitly as type-checking subgoals in the hh ! formulas, and thus handled by logic programming search. For example, consider a goal of the form (true A B) in the rst-order logic speci cation. In Elf, before backchaining on the context item specifying the -introduction rule, the interpreter veri es that A B has type form. In the corresponding hh ! program, the term A B in the head of the clause translating the -I context item will unify with any term of type ob. It is the subgoals (hastype A form) and (hastype B form) which will succeed or fail depending on whether A and B represent rst-order formulas. In addition, when such programs are used as theorem provers, LF proofs are built at the meta-level by Elf, whereas they are explicit arguments to the hastype predicate in hh ! speci cations and are built by uni cation on simply typedterms.
A Full and Canonical LF
In this section, we show the correspondence between canonical LF as presented in Section 3, and full LF as presented in 10]. The rules of full LF are the rules of Figure 1 in Section 3 except for (FAM-LEMMA) and (OBJ-LEMMA) plus the application and conversion rules given in Figure 7 which replace the application rules in Figure 2 Lemma 9 (Subderivation) (We will abbreviate C(x; ?) as C(x) in the remainder of this section, since ? can always be determined from context.)
The following lemma holds for both canonical and full LF.
Lemma 12 Let ? be a valid context containing x : P where P is canonical. Then ?`C(x) : P is provable.
Proof : The proof is by induction on the structure of P and relies on the fact that for any variable z and well-typed canonical term Q, ( C(z)=z]Q) = Q.
Using this lemma, the following result about canonical LF can be proven. De nition 14 A canonical derivation in full LF is a derivation such that the following hold.
corresponding (APP) rule to obtain ?; x : A`P(C(x)) : Q, followed by an (ABS) rule to obtain ?` x:A:P(C(x)) : x:A:Q. We now de ne by induction an operation L which maps a derivation in full LF to a sequence of typing judgments. As we will see, the sequence of judgments associated to a canonical derivation is exactly the set of lemmas that will be added to the context to obtain the corresponding derivation in canonical LF.
De nition 15 L maps a derivation in full LF to a sequence of typing judgments de ned by induction on the derivation as follows. It can be shown by a straightforward induction on a derivation of ?` that for each judgment P :Q in the sequence associated to this assertion by L, ?`P : Q holds. Let x 1 : P 1 ; : : :; x n : P n be a valid context in full LF. For i = 1; : : :; n, we denote the subcontext whose last element is x i : P i as ? i . Given a derivation of`? n context, for i = 1; : : :; n, let i be the context associated to the subderivation of ? i?1`Pi kind or ? i?1`Pi : Type. We say that the context 1 ; x 1 : P 1 ; : : :; n ; x n : P n is the extended normal context associated to this derivation.
Theorem 16 (Completeness of Canonical LF) Let ? be a context and a judgment such that`? context and ?` have canonical derivations in full LF. Let ? 0 be the extended normal context associated to the derivation of`? context, and let be the set of typing judgments associated to the derivation of ?` by the function L. Then ? 0 ; is a valid context and ? 0 ; ` is provable in canonical LF.
Proof : We rst prove the above statement under the additional hypotheses that ? 0 is a valid context in canonical LF. Using this result, it can be proved by a straightforward induction on the length of ? that ? 0 is valid. The proof is by induction on the height of a canonical derivation in full LF of ?` . For the case when the last rule is an (APP) rule, we must consider the subproof that contains a series of n (APP) rules, where n 1 and the leftmost premise ?`P : Q is not the conclusion of an (APP) rule. We consider the case when this premise is not the conclusion of a (VAR) rule. Thus P and Q are pre-canonical. First, we show that ? 0 ; is a valid context. Let 0 be the sequence associated to ?`P : Q by L, and for i = 1; : : :; n, let i be the sequence associated with the right premise in the ith (APP) rule application. Then is 0 ; P : Q ; 1 ; : : :; n . By the induction hypothesis applied to ?`P : Q, the context ? 0 ; 0 is valid and ? 0 ; 0`P : Q holds. Hence ? 0 ; 0 ; P : Q is a valid context. Also, by the induction hypothesis, for i = 1; : : :; n, ? 0 ; i is a valid context. Thus, we can conclude that ? 0 ; is valid. We now show ? 0 ; ` holds. By the induction hypothesis, for i = 1; : : :; n, for each right premise ?` i in the series of (APP) rules, ? 0 ; i` i holds. Clearly ? 0 ; ` i also holds. Using the context item P :Q , we can simply apply the canonical LF rule (APP-FAM) or (APP-OBJ) to these n assertions to obtain that ? 0 ; ` holds. The case when ?`P : Q is the conclusion of a (VAR) rule is similar.
For the case when the last rule is a (PI) Proof : The proof is by induction on the structure of proofs. A similar result is stated for the more general presentation of LF in 10].
The following lemma shows that the left premise is redundant in all derivations of assertions such that the term on the left in the judgment is not an abstraction.
Lemma 19 Let ? be a valid context and ?` a provable assertion in LF 0 that has a proof whose last rule is an application of (APP-FAM) or (APP-OBJ), and that has an application of (ABS-OBJ 0 ) above the root such that there are no other applications of (APP-FAM) or (APP-OBJ) below it. Let ? 0 be the context, and x:A be the variable and its type bound by in the conclusion of this application of (ABS-OBJ 0 ). Then ? 0`A : Type is provable.
Proof : Let Q : x 1 :A 1 : : : x n :A n :P be the context item used in the rule application at the root, and N 1 ; : : :; N n the terms on the right of the colon in the remaining premises. Since there is an (ABS-OBJ 0 ) application above the root, then for some i such that 1 i n, A i has the form z : B:C, the corresponding premise of the (APP) Theorem 20 Let ? be a context that is valid in LF and LF 0 , and let be a judgment.
